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ABSTRACT
This article reviews the literature on the institutional position of national
parliaments in the EU. It focuses on new institutional developments,
explanations, and effects discussed over the course of the last decade.
Existing datasets on parliamentary oversight institutions in EU affairs and
economic governance have been extended to 2020 to inform the discussion.
A systematic overview of new analyses of the effects of oversight institutions
in EU and domestic politics is offered as well. Cutting across the debate as to
whether parliaments are multi-level or domestic players in the EU, this review
concludes that the last decade has seen growing policy specialization in the
institutional position of national parliaments at the European and national
levels, and that the causes and consequences of this development remain
largely unstudied.
KEYWORDS European Union; national parliaments; oversight institutions; economic governance;
interparliamentary conferences
Introduction
This article reviews the literature on the institutional position of national par-
liaments in the EU. It complements research on parliamentary behavior,
which has received most attention recently (Auel et al., 2015b; Rauh & De
Wilde, 2018; Senninger, 2017; Winzen et al., 2018), by highlighting important
developments, analytical progress, and areas for further research regarding
the formal role and rights of national parliaments in the EU. About a
decade after the last review articles (Goetz & Meyer-Sahling, 2008; Raunio,
2009; Winzen, 2010) and data collections (Auel et al., 2015a; Karlas, 2011;
Winzen, 2012), and following major integration crises, this is an appropriate
moment to review and suggest next steps for this research agenda.
The following three sections respectively focus on developments in and
explanations and effects of the institutional position of national parliaments.
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A decade ago, scholars called for more systematic data and analysis, and
asked whether formal rules mattered at all. There has been significant pro-
gress regarding these concerns. In particular, new datasets on EU-related par-
liamentary rights and debates have been created and analyzed (Auel et al.,
2015a; Rauh & De Wilde, 2018; Winzen, 2012), and use has been made of
related data on outcomes such as position-taking and voting in the Council
of Ministers or European Parliament. New questions have emerged as well.
Most importantly, recent years have been characterized by growing policy
specialization in national parliamentary institutions domestically and at the
EU-level. This review provides new data on these developments, but open
questions remain as to their explanations and consequences.
Institutional developments
National parliaments’ institutional position has developed in the domestic arena
and at the European level. Considering the domestic level first, it is known that
parliaments rely on ‘oversight institutions’ to monitor EU affairs, gain infor-
mation, and constrain and influence the government. Table 1 shows the main
Table 1. Key parliamentary oversight institutions in EU affairs.
Oversight institution Definition and coding
European Affairs Committee
(EAC)
Parliaments can have dedicated EACs or combine EU affairs and other




Parliaments can create strong mechanisms for the involvement of
sectoral committees in scrutinizing EU affairs. Rules might invite but
not require their involvement or leave their role vague or open.
Coding: 1=Strong mechanisms. 0.5=Optional or occasional
involvement. 0=Vague or no mechanisms.
Explanatory memorandum
(Memo)
Parliaments can require that governments routinely detail the
background and their intended position on EU documents. They
might do so only in rare circumstances or not at all. Coding:
1=Memorandum generally required. 0=Memorandum not or rarely
required.
Scrutiny reserve (Reserve) Parliaments can impose a reserve to prevent the government from
taking a position for a substantial period or until scrutiny is
concluded. Coding: 1=Scrutiny reserve. 0=No reserve.
Mandating rights (Mandate) Parliaments can approve or mandate positions of the government,
which has to comply. Parliaments might allow the government to
deviate if it gives reasons, and valid reasons are not restricted
significantly. Coding: 1=Binding mandates with no or few exceptions.
0.5=Justified deviation routinely possible. 0=No mandating.
Aggregating oversight
institutions
A standardized count of (types of) institutions is used here to describe
oversight institutions: Information-related institutions: (EAC +
Seccom + Memo)/3. Constraining institutions: (Reserve + Mandate)/
2. Overall strength: (Information-related institutions + Constraining
institutions)/2.
Note: The selection of institutions builds on Winzen (2012). Appendix 1 offers further information on the
data collection. Table A1 in the appendix shows examples from domestic laws and parliamentary rules
of procedure.
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institutionsdiscussed in the literature. Scholars havenoted increasinguseof and
cross-national convergence on these institutions (Buzogány, 2013; Jungar, 2010;
Karlas, 2011; Raunio, 2009), althougharound2010significant variation remained
(Auel et al., 2015a;Winzen, 2012). We can chart these institutions, individually or
aggregated (see rules in Table 1), for an empirically grounded discussion of
recent developments. To this end, data in Winzen (2012) have been extended
to 2020, as explained in Appendix 1.
Figure 1(a) shows long-term growth in oversight institutions. Since 2010,
incremental reforms have strengthened sectoral committee involvement
and information supply. Romania enacted a broader reform that had been
delayed since accession. In 2013, the Croatian parliament followed other
post-2004 member states by adopting strong oversight institutions (Jungar,
2010; Karlas, 2011). The only case of weakening stems from Cyprus combining
the EAC and other committees. That several reforms strengthened sectoral
committees accords with claims that EU scrutiny has become sectorally
‘mainstreamed’ (Gattermann et al., 2016), although institutionally this trend
began in the 1990s (Winzen, 2012, p. 667).
Cross-national differences remain significant (Figure 1(b)). Some parlia-
ments do not go beyond basic committee structures. A second group empha-
sizes information and a third relies more on instruments to intervene in
government position-taking. However, most parliaments have mixed
systems and even this group varies. Hence, the popular distinction
between ‘mandating’ and ‘document’ systems does not capture observed
structures well (see also House of Commons, 2013, p. 14). Indeed, while
groupings have heuristic value, the figure suggests that variation in oversight
systems should generally be seen as gradual rather than categorical.
There have been changes not captured in these data. Parliaments have
reacted to new rules of the Lisbon Treaty (Auel & Neuhold, 2017). Many
Figure 1. Variation in parliamentary oversight institutions.
Note: Panel (a) charts the strength of oversight institutions over all member states (±one standard devi-
ation). Panel (b) shows countries along dimensions of oversight institutions in 2019. Close dots have
been separated for legibility but are identical. See the last row of Table 1 for measurement details.
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parliaments have adjusted their rules to incorporate new opportunities for
monitoring subsidiarity under the Early Warning Mechanism (e.g., Cooper,
2012; Malang et al., 2019; Miklin, 2017). Moreover, many parliaments now
require that governments obtain approval before agreeing to simplified
treaty revisions and transitions from unanimity to qualified majority voting
under certain provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.
However, the main question in recent years has been whether national
parliaments react to EU reforms of Economic and Monetary Union. de
Wilde and Raunio (2018) argue that parliaments should focus more on econ-
omic governance (see also Crum, 2018; Lord, 2017). Behavioral studies
examine whether parliaments debate facets of economic governance (Haller-
berg et al., 2018; Kreilinger, 2018; Maatsch, 2017; Rasmussen, 2018). To assess
institutional adaptation, data on parliamentary rights in the European Stab-
ility Mechanism (ESM) and the European Semester (ES), first presented in Ritt-
berger and Winzen (2015), have been extended to 2020 based on the scheme
in in Table 2 (see also Appendix 1).
Figure 2 shows considerable variation in parliamentary rights in economic
governance. About half of the Euro area parliaments have noteworthy formal
rights in ESM decision-making, and half of all member state parliaments have
some formal role in the European Semester. Only few parliaments, and only
one outside of the Euro area, have instituted extensive monitoring of the
European Semester. Yet, it should be kept in mind that some parliaments
might deem existing oversight systems sufficient to accommodate economic
governance. The Finish parliament, for example, explicitly refrained from
reform for this reason (Kreilinger, 2018, p. 330).
Table 2. Parliamentary rights in the ESM and European Semester.
ESM: Approval ESM: Information European Semester
0 No No or minor (e.g., quarterly
reports)
No reforms
0.5 Selective The parliament
approves a sub-set of key
decisions or has otherwise
minor participation rights




government is required to
report on ESM affairs
without clarification of the
scope or timing of
information or has to
provide further information
only on parliament’s own
initiative.
Moderate reforms Rights in




Reform Programmes at the
same time as the EU.
1 Yes The parliament approves
voting intentions on key
decisions.







participation in decisions on
important documents.
Note: Adapted from Rittberger and Winzen (2015). Key decisions: Decisions on aid programs, memoran-
dums of understanding, the authorization of aid tranches within programs, the choice and changes of
instruments in aid programs, and the authorization of callable capital. We do not consider approval of
ESM treaty changes (e.g., if ESM lending volume or country contributions change).
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In addition to domestic oversight, there have been developments at the
European level. Already before 2010, interparliamentary meetings of Speak-
ers, EACs, and other committees, and coordination for monitoring subsidiar-
ity, and more generally the tentative emergence of a ‘field’ of
interparliamentary relations had been highlighted (Cooper, 2006; Crum &
Fossum, 2009). Yet, interparliamentary cooperation had remained informal
and weak overall (Raunio, 2009). Since 2010, three new, policy-specific inter-
parliamentary conferences have given greater formality to interparliamentary
relations (Table 3) (Cooper, 2016, 2017; Fromage, 2018; Hefftler & Gatter-
mann, 2015; Herranz-Surrallés, 2014; Wouters & Raube, 2012). Except for
Figure 2. Variation of parliamentary rights in economic governance in 2019.
Note: Updated from Rittberger and Winzen (2015). The color scheme encodes the values in Table 2: Dark
blue=1. Light blue=0.5. Red=0. Countries outside of the Euro area are listed separately starting with
Denmark (DK).
Table 3. New interparliamentary conferences.
Conference Characteristics
Inter-Parliamentary Conference for
the Common Foreign and
Security Policy and the Common





Debate/information exchange to strengthen
parliaments’ information when carrying
out their respective roles.
Decision of the EU Speakers Conference,
Rules of Procedure.
September 2012, Cyprus. Biannual meetings.














Article 13 of the Fiscal Compact, Rules of
Procedure.
October 2013, Lithuania. Biannual meetings.
Parliamentary delegations (flexible size).






To monitor Europol’s activities, including the
impact on fundamental rights and
freedoms of natural persons.
Article 12 TEU, Article 88 TFEU, Regulation
2016/794, Rules of Procedure.
October 2017, European Parliament.
Biannual meetings.
Parliamentary delegations (4 members, 16
from the EP).
Note: In addition to the legal bases listed in the table, the articles 9 and 10 of the Protocol on the Role of
National Parliaments in the European Union allow national parliaments and the EP to organize inter-
parliamentary cooperation.
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the JPSG, which has stronger information rights and delegates an observer to
the Europol board, these conferences’ competences are restricted to monitor-
ing and debate. Interparliamentary cooperation has thus gained in institutio-
nalization but not formal authority.
Finally, in the shadow of the above developments, parliamentary bureauc-
racies have been strengthened in many countries and now also encompass
officials based in Brussels (Högenauer et al., 2016; Högenauer & Neuhold,
2015; Neuhold & Högenauer, 2016). Parliamentary bureaucracies often
select EU affairs priorities for parliamentary attention and thus occupy a
potentially significant agenda-setting position. Recent studies have thus
raised questions about intra-parliamentary delegation relationships, but sys-
tematic data on the organization of these relationships remains rare (Chris-
tiansen et al., 2014; Winzen, 2014).
Summing up, while variation in oversight institutions persists, the main
trend of the past decade points towards more reliance on specialized exper-
tise and policy-specific procedures – or what could be called ‘policy special-
ization’. With few exceptions, sectoral committees are partly or strongly
involved in domestic oversight, special mechanisms for economic govern-
ance have emerged, and policy-specific interparliamentary conferences
have been created. Specialized EU affairs bureaucracies have been reinforced
to support these developments.
Explanations
Efforts to explain the institutional position of national parliaments in the EU
often start by asking which parliamentary actors might bemotivated and able
to strengthen domestic oversight. A difficulty is that opposition parties might
be motivated but unable whereas governing parties might be able but unmo-
tivated to do so. One response is that the EU weakens oversight for majority
parties and aggravates oversight problems under coalition and minority gov-
ernments (Benz, 2004; Bergman, 2000; Saalfeld, 2005). Early studies also
expect reforms where parliamentarians are accustomed to significant over-
sight rights and face pressure from Eurosceptic electorates (Benz, 2004; Dimi-
trakopoulos, 2001; Raunio, 2005).
Recent literature offers a new perspective. Parties are assumed to hold
beliefs about the appropriate and democratic design of the EU (Jachtenfuchs
et al., 1998) and consider the necessity of parliamentary reform against the
background of these beliefs if the EU gains authority (Rittberger, 2003). Motiv-
ation for reform thus becomes independent of being in government or oppo-
sition, but instead depends on the ‘constitutional preferences’ of parties – in
particular, on whether they deem national parliamentary oversight democra-
tically necessary for the EU and whether they consider the empowerment of
the EP sufficient to overcome democratic deficits (Winzen, 2017; Winzen et al.,
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2015). Pre-existing parliamentary rights, in this view, reflect past consti-
tutional conflicts and preferences that have become shared across most
parties (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001). Pre-existing rights, if codified constitution-
ally, could also be extended to EU affairs by courts rather than parties
(Kiiver, 2010).
As Raunio (2009) already observed, there is some convergence in the lit-
erature that existing parliamentary institutions and, if less consistently
across studies, popular Euroscepticism are relevant explanatory factors.
Recent studies highlight party positions in addition. Yet, comparing the
importance of these factors remains ambiguous because operationalizations
vary. This seems to reflect different timepoints at which studies were con-
ducted (and thus variation in available data and approaches), lack of accepted
data (e.g., on domestic parliamentary rights), and different ideas for measure-
ment. In comparison to other areas of EU studies (and beyond), this is hardly
unusual but still reminds us to aim for convergence not only in theory but
also in measurement whenever reasonably possible.
There has also been renewed attention to similarity between parliaments.
The diffusion of oversight institutions has been discussed for some time, but
evidence had initially remained rare (Buzogány, 2013; Jungar, 2010; Raunio,
2009, p. 319). One recent study suggests that new member states and
young democracies adopt oversight systems from culturally alike and suc-
cessful parliaments (Bormann & Winzen, 2016). Senninger (2020) argues
that diffusion is likely if parliamentary majority parties share constitutional
preferences, thus developing a more political argument compatible with
the theoretical perspective above. In both studies, a ‘shortage’ of member
states and institutional changes poses analytical challenges. Further research
at the levels of parliamentarians and mechanisms might thus be desirable.
Analyses of parliamentary rights in economic governance are still rare. Ritt-
berger and Winzen (2015) find that ESM rights are lacking in parliaments with
weak budget rights and EU oversight institutions. Institutional weakness in
domestic and EU affairs thus seems to extend to this area. They find no expla-
nation for European Semester adaptation, however. Kreilinger (2018) and
Maatsch (2017) suggest that parliamentary rights in budget or EU matters
are a prerequisite for parliamentary involvement in the European Semester.
Rasmussen (2018) concludes that pre-existing oversight institutions facilitate
parliamentary involvement in the European Semester, while Euro area
members are not more involved than outsiders. In contrast, Hallerberg
et al. (2018) find that Euro area membership matters. These studies
examine a variety of institutional or behavioral outcomes, often in the early
years of the European Semester, and cover various countries. More compara-
tive and recent data might thus resolve some divergent findings. Given the
salience of economic governance in recent years, party and popular Euro-
scepticism might also deserve further attention, although some of the
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above studies find mixed or no evidence (Hallerberg et al., 2018; Rittberger &
Winzen, 2015).
Finally, what explains the emergence of interparliamentary conferences?
The aims and competences of these conferences have remained modest
due to interparliamentary disagreements. There is a link to arguments on
constitutional preferences in that disagreement seems to reflect different pre-
ferences on the role of the EP and national parliaments in the EU (Cooper,
2016). Analyses of parliamentary debates, interviews, and contributions to
COSAC further suggest that many parliamentarians consider domestic over-
sight and debate rather than interparliamentary cooperation their priority
(Kinski, 2020; Raunio, 2011). It has also been argued that parliaments are
least willing to strengthen interparliamentary conferences if they have dom-
estic oversight rights already and salience is low – for example, if they are in a
favorable macroeconomic position in the area of economic governance (Ritt-
berger & Winzen, 2015). These studies share a focus on the competences of
interparliamentary conferences but leave open why these conferences exist.
In this respect, Herranz-Surrallés (2014) considers the conference in CFSP a
compromise – instead of empowerment of the EP or domestic oversight –
between competing authority claims by the EP and national parliaments.
Further tests of this or other arguments remain rare, however.
Overall, there has been significant progress in all strands of the literature.
Across the literature, the question that appears to have remained most
ambiguous is why different types of oversight institutions emerge. Within
countries, most research focuses on the aggregate strength of oversight insti-
tutions, but we saw earlier that there are also different mixes of institutions.
Similarly, why certain countries and not others create specific rights in econ-
omic governance (and only in economic governance) and why certain policy
areas rather than others feature interparliamentary conferences remains
unclear.
Some ways to address the above questions empirically seem relatively
clear. First, future studies could disaggregate the dependent variable.
Instead of aggregate measures of the strength of oversight institutions, it
seems promising to focus on variation in specific institutions – e.g., the invol-
vement of sectoral committees – or intermediary steps in the causal chain
such as parliamentarians’ perceptions of institutional reform (as in some of
the studies cited above). Second, in particular to explain the emergence of
interparliamentary conferences or policy-specific domestic oversight, com-
parisons across policies seem promising. Which policy characteristics, poss-
ibly in interaction with domestic factors, explain (the absence of)
institutional changes at the European level and in national parliaments?
Theoretically, these strategies might create leverage on existing and new
explanations. For example, it has been argued that EU oversight institutions
reflect existing institutions. Do we see sectoral committees closely involved or
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specialized parliamentary bureaucracies where these already existed? More-
over, the observation that parliaments create distinct domestic and Euro-
pean-level rules in some areas indicates that certain policy characteristics
might matter. For example, interparliamentary conferences have evidently
emerged in the EU’s core state policies (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2014).
This could be a decisive policy feature. Yet, it is less clear why interparliamen-
tary conferences emerged long after the EU first obtained authority in core
state policies. Finally, new developments such as interparliamentary confer-
ences or parliamentary rights in economic governance constitute an oppor-
tunity to relate this literature to the far-flung debate on differentiated
integration (Holzinger & Schimmelfennig, 2012). If parliaments are less
exposed to EU authority because they have opted-out of the Euro area,
internal security, or foreign and defense policies, does this influence their
institutional preferences and reform choices?
Effects
Do oversight institutions and other parliamentary rights have effects on Euro-
pean and domestic politics? Formal rules and rights create opportunities for
parliamentary actors and requirements for governments. Yet, since party poli-
tics and other factors are bound to influence the behavior of these actors
strongly, scholars have long wondered whether formal rules really matter –
and, if so, for which outcomes (e.g., Auel, 2007; Pollak & Slominski, 2003).
In the last decade, many relevant studies have appeared. To convey a sys-
tematic overview, Table A2 (Appendix 2) collates all journal publications until
November 2020 that (1) cite Auel et al. (2015a) or Winzen (2012) and (2)
examine the effects of oversight institutions.1 Among the 29 publications,
three main groups exist. Eight studies examine governmental preferences,
bargaining success, and voting as well as voting in the EP. Eight contributions
focus on national parliamentary activities such as issuing resolutions or
devoting time to EU documents. Finally, five articles examine parliamentary
debate specifically. Other outcomes include implementation, opposition
behavior, reasoned opinions, role perceptions, media coverage, and
support for inter-parliamentary cooperation. Turning to the results of these
studies, 14 report an effect of oversight institutions, eight find an effect but
with some qualifications, and seven find no effect. The envisaged mechan-
isms vary but often indicate that strong institutions facilitate parliamentar-
ians’ awareness of EU policymaking. For example, Hagemann et al. (2019)
suggest that parliaments with strong oversight procedures might notice
‘no’ votes in the Council, which motivates governments to cast such votes.
Auel et al. (2015b) argue that strong rights ‘facilitate’ various activities in
EU affairs. Winzen et al. (2018) claim that strong rights mean that parliamen-
tarians regularly receive information and thus pay attention to EU affairs. For
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the media, institutionally strong parliaments might also appear more relevant
(Auel et al., 2018). More discussion than possible here, would certainly be
desirable. Yet, clearly, the literature now offers a better sense than a
decade ago of the effects oversight institutions might have theoretically –
and some reason for confidence that some of these effects do in fact exist.
It is likely that research in the above areas will continue to appear. In
addition, two new areas of interest in the study of the effects of parliamentary
rights in the EU can be identified. First, we still know little about the impli-
cations of recent institutional developments – that is, parliamentary adap-
tation to economic governance and the emergence of interparliamentary
conferences. The consequences of different mixes of domestic oversight insti-
tutions also remain largely unstudied. Second, of the 29 studies almost all
examine parties, parliaments, or governments rather than parliamentarians.
This could be an unused opportunity. Oversight institutions and interparlia-
mentary conferences might have the strongest effects at the individual
level by shaping the information, and policy and political beliefs of the
actors involved.
In particular, studies at the individual level promise analytical opportu-
nities that are not readily available at more aggregate levels. Drawing for
example on parliamentary speech, new outcomes of interest could be con-
ceptualized and measured such as legitimacy beliefs, the informational and
deliberative quality of speeches, or degrees of support or opposition to the
government. Large literatures in legislative studies and some studies cited
here already offer practical tools. For scholars interested in the effect of par-
liamentary institutions in EU affairs, these new outcomes open up new
research design opportunities. For example, do parliamentarians’ legitimacy
beliefs change depending on participation in interparliamentary conferences,
EU affairs committees, or sectoral committees with varying formal roles in EU
affairs? How do outcomes for these parliamentarians differ from others who
are not or less involved in EU oversight institutions at the national or Euro-
pean level?
Conclusion
Recent years have seen debate about whether national parliaments are
becoming ‘multi-arena’ actors, remain focused on domestic oversight, or
turn towards interparliamentary cooperation (Auel & Neuhold, 2017; Kinski,
2020; Raunio, 2011). This review highlights an institutional trend that cross-
cuts these alternatives. The last ten years have been characterized by
growing policy specialization in the institutional position of national parlia-
ments (see also Gattermann et al., 2016). Oversight institutions in EU affairs
have developed in this direction, special rights in economic governance
have emerged, and policy-specific interparliamentary conferences have
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been created. Specialized bureaucracies have grown in parallel. How we
might explain these developments, and what effects they might have at
the EU and domestic levels, remains open to debate.
Note
1. These two articles have been chosen because they are linked to the two most
commonly used data sources – one was introduced above and the other is a
cross-sectional dataset collected by the OPAL project around 2010-12. It
focuses on parliamentary behavior, but also includes information on national
parliaments’ institutional rights.
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